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Abstract 
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are quickly gaining popularity in both 
military applications and commercial technologies due to their low cost and 
reconfigurable capabilities. With FPGAs being used for military and other sensitive 
applications, the threat of an adversary attacking these devices is an ever present danger. 
While having the ability to be reconfigured is helpful for development, it also poses the 
risk of its hardware design being cloned. Static random access memory (SRAM) FPGA’s 
are the most common type of FPGA used in industry. Every time an SRAM-FPGA is 
powered up, its configuration must be downloaded, to program the design on the device. 
If an adversary is able to obtain that configuration, they can clone possibly sensitive 
designs to other FPGAs. Cloning attacks must be prevented to ensure that the information 
stored on these devices remains secure. Protection against these types of attacks is 
especially pertinent within the Department of Defense, where FPGAs are being used in a 
variety of applications where cloning attacks could lead to critical designs being obtained 
by foreign governments.  
A technique that can be used to protect FPGAs from these types of attacks is 
known as Digital Fingerprinting.  Digital Fingerprinting takes advantage of the 
manufacturing variability that naturally occurs in the integrated circuit fabrication 
process, monitoring unique responses in path delay. If another factor can be introduced 
making the FPGA’s operation dependent on more than the design specified within its 
configuration and response to external outputs, we can defend against cloning. This type 
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of solution would allow for an FPGA’s operation to be dependent on how the 
downloaded configuration interacts with the hardware itself. This research attempts to use 
Digital Fingerprinting technology to create unique device specific generated keys for use 
as encryption keys or control values for polymorphic circuits to protect information on 
FPGAs.  
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CRITICAL INFORMATION PROTECTION ON FPGAs THROUGH UNIQUE 
DEVICE SPECIFIC DIGITAL KEYS 
I. Introduction 
1.1 Research Motivation  
In recent years, Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) use within the Department 
of Defense (DoD) has been on the rise. Within the DoD, FPGAs are being used in aircraft 
avionics systems, and in other system critical hardware[1][2].  FPGAs are available as 
commercial off-the-shelf products that are low cost and easy to obtain, making them ideal 
for product development and testing, and the choice for moderate production runs and 
rapid product development[3]. Protecting these systems is important to their continued 
use in the DoD as well as in the commercial sector.  
Protecting FPGA systems from reverse engineering and product cloning is necessary 
if the DoD is going to continue relying on their use. An FPGA’s configuration, can be 
easily cloned if the device bitstream can be intercepted. The bitstream is a list of 
instructions sent to the FPGA when it is powered up, instructing it to configure itself in a 
certain way. In a cloning attack, a FPGA’s bitstream is intercepted and used to configure 
another FPGA, resulting in counterfeit systems. Such cloning attacks not only affect 
commercial gains, but can also lead to critical DoD technology being obtained by foreign 
nations or military groups. In order to ensure the security of the designs and information 
stored on FPGAs security measures need to be put in place to defeat cloning attacks.  
Two types of countermeasures that can be used to thwart cloning attacks include 
active and passive countermeasures. An active form of protection involves monitoring of 
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the FPGA by the software running on it to authenticate the device, or adding additional 
protections via software or hardware. Examples of active countermeasures include 
checking a device’s serial number, additional verification hardware, and data encryption.  
One protection option already being offered by most FPGA manufacturers is an option to 
encrypt the bitstream so that a design cannot be directly extracted [4]. Bitstream 
encryption protects the design from being recovered, but as shown by [5][6] does not 
prevent against cloning.  
Passive countermeasures are those which rely on a design being specifically created 
to operate on a particular FPGA. Passive countermeasures may rely on variables which 
cannot be controlled by an adversary such as device architecture, signal propagation 
delay, or power consumption.  Passive countermeasures are more robust than active 
measures, because they cannot be easily defeated. An active countermeasure can be 
circumvented through hardware and software manipulation, but a passive countermeasure 
is dependent on the actual structure and composition of the device itself, which cannot be 
changed.  
 The ability to create a passive countermeasure which allows for a design which 
operates correctly only on a specified FPGA or group of FPGAs would ensure that a 
design cannot be cloned onto an unauthorized device. Such a design would either fail to 
run on an unauthorized FPGA, or operate incorrectly. This ability would also allow for 
the creation of unique device specific keys for encryption and identification. If the design 
functions correctly only on a specified FPGA, a key generation method used on one 
FPGA will produce a different key if run on another FPGA.  These generated keys can 
then be used as encryption keys for encryption hardware running on the device, such that 
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two FPGAs will not encrypt the data the same way, and since the key is generated on the 
board, the keys are unknown to the user, or an adversary.  
These keys can also be used for device identification since they are unique to a 
specific board. A FPGA can be profiled; the generated key recorded, and then sent out 
into the field. Upon the devices return, it can be profiled again, a comparison of the two 
keys will show if the FPGA is indeed the same board. Device identification is very 
important, to ensure that a returned device hasn’t been counterfeited or tampered with. 
This property is especially important within the DoD to ensure that a device on loan to 
another country or contracting company has not been tampered with in an espionage 
attempt or an attempt to cause harm. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
   The Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Group at the Air Force Institute of 
Technology (AFIT) has been working topics leading to this research for several years. In 
2009, Patel introduced a technique to identify FPGAs through physical variations that 
occur during manufacturing [7], and in 2010 and 2011, Anilao and Stanton laid the 
groundwork for digital key generation by producing a probe to measure propagation 
delay between two paths [8] 9]. Through the use of this probe, a FPGA’s structure can be 
utilized as a passive countermeasure.  This technique can be used to positively identify an 
FPGA, and create unique keys to ensure the security of the FPGA and the design stored 
within it. By continuing the research efforts of previous VLSI group members, an 
improved identification and key generation method can be created.  
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1.3 Research Objectives and Contributions 
The desired outcome of this research is the creation and analysis of device 
generated digital keys to be used for device protection and identification.  This research is 
broken into three main parts; digital key generation, key comparison and analysis, and 
key implementation. These three parts have the goal of implementing a usable digital key 
system and analyzing its ability to create unique device specific keys.  
1.3.1.1 Circuit DNA/Digital Key Generation 
The generation of circuit DNA and digital keys is based off of the work by 
Stanton [8], leveraging his tunable probe design to characterize an FPGA and produce 
keys. By varying the number of buffers on a pair of paths, the probe can be used to 
determine how much delay is required on each line to equalize the delay between the two 
paths.   When multiple readings are taken, the path delays can be averaged and used to 
and provide a single bit value which represents the delay.  128 probes are used in the 
design in order to generate a 128-bit digital key, which would be useful for encryption 
purposes. A full sweep of possible delay values on each probe will be used to generate 
Circuit DNA for device family matching. This research is evaluated in two ways; digital 
key stability and distinguishability. 
1.3.1.2 Key Comparison and Analysis 
In order for generated keys to be useful, they must be repeatable. The measure of 
the repeatability of a key is referred to as stability. Stability is an important measurement 
because it is a reflection of the ability for a particular FPGA to consistently produce the 
same key. A consistent key is a vital characteristic if the key is to be used for encryption, 
to ensure that data is encrypted properly each time ad can be subsequently recovered.  
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A measure to describe uniqueness of a key is what is referred to in this research as 
distinguishability. Ensuring that the keys generated on separate FPGAs are unique is 
important to this research. Keys which are the same across multiple boards are not secure 
for encryption because they are not unique to a specific device. Unique and stable keys 
are required for encryption to be effective. 
1.3.1.3 Key Implementation 
One of the main goals of this research is to produce unique and stable keys to be used 
for encryption keys. The ability to produce such keys concludes research that has been 
ongoing within the VLSI research group for several years, crossing from theoretical ideas 
to actual implementation. The implementation of the digital keys involves using them as 
both encryption keys for a symmetric key system such as the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) and as part of an unclonable software/polymorphic circuit 
system[10][11][12]. This implementation is a final check to ensure that this research has 
culminated into a feasible working product. 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
 The following chapters detail the process and the extent of this research while 
also providing the results. Chapter 2 contains the necessary background information 
required to understand the topics discussed in the research. Chapter 3 provides 
methodology behind the research, along with a proposed experiment. Chapter 4 contains 
the results of the experiment described in the previous chapter. Chapter 5 provides a 
summary of this research, its relevance, and the major contributions of this thesis; it also 
contains suggestions for further research. 
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II.  Literature Survey  
 
The following chapter presents some background information to orient the reader 
with the topics addressed in this thesis, and to give a better understanding of previous 
work that has been done in the field. This chapter is divided into four sections as follows: 
Section 2.1 covers physical variations within CMOS fabrication, Section 2.2 covers 
Physical Unclonable Circuits, Section 2.3 discusses the previous research by the VLSI 
group at AFIT on the topic of digital fingerprints, and Section 2.4 provides a summary of 
the literature survey.   
2.1 Physical variations in CMOS circuit manufacturing 
The basic building block of any integrated circuit is the transistor. At the most 
basic level of abstraction, a transistor functions as a switch. Two types of transistors 
exist; negative and positive Metal Oxide Semiconductor, commonly known as nMOS and 
pMOS, the difference between which is the determined by the type of electrical carrier 
(positive or negative) under its gate. Transistors contain three main parts, a gate, a source, 
and a drain. The minimum voltage required for a transistor to activate is known as the 
threshold voltage or . When  has been met, the transistor will turn on, allowing 
current to flow. In an nMOS transistor, while the voltage between the source and drain, 
known as , is between 0V and  −  , where   is the voltage between the gate and 
source, it is in what is known as linear mode. While in linear mode, , which is the 
current from source to drain, increases linearly with . When is greater than  −
, the transistor is operating in a
not result in a increase in 
A transistor’s size is determined by the width of the gate. 
in a larger channel width beneath the gate. A wider channel width results in a slower 
transistor. Transistor technology is described by the 
Currently, 32nm technology is common in commercial products, including Intel’s Core 
i3, Core i5 and Core i7[14
Figure 1. (a) An ideal transistor design. (b) Image of a transistor as viewed by an electron microscope
With such small feature sizes, creating transistors exactly as they are designed 
becomes a difficult problem. 
and drain are both clearly defined, with sharp st
transistors are not shaped the same way. 
electron microscope of a transistor. Due to the unpredictable behavior of atoms, they 
cannot be forced into forming straight lines. The diffusion of ions into the substrate 
results in random deviations
controlled in the manufacturing process, such
chemical mechanical planarization 
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 region known as saturation, where a raise in 
 [13]. 
A wider the gate, results 
fixed length of the transistors gate.  
]. 
[15]. 
Figure 1 (a) shows an ideal transistor, notice that 
aight edges. In real world 
Figure 1 (b) shows the image from a scanning 
[16]. Deviations occur due to circumstances which cannot be 
 as variation after oxide deposition and 
[17][18][19]. 
 will 
 
 
the source 
fabrication, 
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 Creating transistors that are exactly alike is unlikely during the CMOS circuit 
manufacturing process. Each transistor created varies slightly from others around it in 
dimension. These variations cause the shape of each transistor to be unique and random. 
These variations in shape cause differences in performance characteristics, such as 
threshold or saturation voltage levels [20]. Since no two transistors are exactly alike, 
when many of the same type of integrated circuits are created using the exact same 
masks, significant differences in delay can exist between equivalent circuits fabricated 
with the same mask set [21].   
2.2 Physical Unclonable Functions 
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are manufactured devices which rely on the 
variations within the manufacturing process to affect the outcome of a circuit. PUFs were 
created to identify and authenticate a device through exploitation of delay variation and 
by measuring transient response [22] 23]. The premise of this work is that PUFs can 
protect against counterfeiting. Since the probability of manufacturing two devices with 
the same manufacturing variations is very low, an adversary would have to fabricate a 
very large number of devices and perform measurements on all of them to identify one 
that would be able to serve as a potential counterfeit [24][25].   
Several different types of PUF circuits have been suggested and implemented. The 
Arbiter PUF used in [21], shown in Figure 2,  is a multiplexer based circuit that depends 
on pairs of multiplexers whose select lines are connected together and controlled by the 
user. The propagated signal delay through the system effects which signal gets latched 
into the D-Latch at the end of the multiplexer chain. Arbiter PUF shows promise in that it 
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is very stable, producing a probability of variation less than 1% on a single device. The 
real problem with this design is that when tested, its ability to produce distinguishable 
results across devices was low, with a probability of variation of about 25%, meaning that 
only ¼ of the time it produced different results on different devices, making it 
unacceptable as a form of unique identification.   
 
Figure 2. Arbiter PUF [21] 
 Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF, shown in Figure 3, relies on a specified number of 
oscillators which oscillate at different frequencies due to manufacturing variances in the 
device. The number of oscillations over a specified amount of time is stored in a counter 
after each RO. The output of the RO PUF is determined by a comparator which compares 
two RO, assigning a value of ‘1’ or ‘0’ based on which counter has a higher count. RO 
PUF’s weakness lies in that it is very susceptible to temperature, voltage and other 
environmental conditions, resulting in an unstable output.  
Another form of PUF that has been tested is the Butterfly PUF (BPUF)[26], shown in 
Figure 4. BPUF uses groupings of two D-latches to generate unique outputs. The BPUF 
is excited by placing a ‘1’ value on the excite line; this causes the D-Latches to enter an 
10 
 
unsteady state for a short amount of time. When a steady state is achieved, its value is 
output on the “out” line. The steady state signal produced is dependent on the physical 
variations of the transistors used in the design. According to the authors of [26], the 
results of this research are promising in that BPUF is stable over a temperature range of -
20 to +80°C, but has a noisy response which causes the design to be unstable.  
 
 
Figure 3. Ring Oscillator PUF[21] 
 
Figure 4. Butterfly PUF [26] 
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2.3 Digital Fingerprint 
Similar to PUF, the Digital Fingerprint (DF) concept was developed concurrently at 
AFIT. In [15], Crouch’s research involved taking advantage of imperfectly shaped 
transistors and allowing their effects to stack upon one another in a large combinational 
circuit magnifying their effect. Crouch’s design implemented a 64-bit combinational 
multiplier with Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) generating pseudo-random 
inputs. 16-bit one-hot-state shift registers were used on the outputs to detect and calculate 
the total number of glitches[27] generated at each output, shifting a ‘1’ value through the 
register.  Crouch was able to uniquely identify each board he tested based off of the 
results in the shift registers, his work served as a proof of concept for the Digital 
Fingerprint technique. 
 
Figure 5. Digital Fingerprint Generator used by Crouch [15] 
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In [7], Patel improved upon the DF concept introduced by Crouch. He improved upon 
the hardware design, reducing the amount of user inaction required for testing to reduce 
the amount of user error added to the testing, he also extensively tested the system 
looking at factors which Crouch had not. In his research, Patel was able to demonstrate 
that there were timing requirements which had to be met in order for glitches to be 
recorded by the shift registers. He showed that digital fingerprints have several factors: 
input combinations to the system, the type of combinational circuit used, the location of 
the design on the FPGA, and the method used to detect and record the glitches [28].H  
also showed that operating temperature had an effect on glitch generation.   
Anilao introduced a smaller glitch generating circuit in [9], which was then modified 
by Stanton in [8] to produce the Tunable Glitch Probe (TGP) laying the groundwork for 
this research. Anilao’s design (shown in Figure 6) included a network of buffers and 
multiplexers allowing for the delay in the system to be controlled by the user. Anilao’s 
design took advantage of the fact that swapping the input of the circuit between minterms 
can cause a glitch consisting of a unintended value to appear at the output for a very 
small amount of time. The Karnaugh Map of Anilao’s circuit [9] can be seen in Figure 7 
with the minterms circled.   
 Stanton modified Anilao’s design reducing it from three inputs (A, B, and C) to just a 
single input. Stanton also added buffers on the primary inputs of the design to add 
additional delay between probes when they are connected in series, to ensure that a 
measurable path delay difference exists between probes. Stanton’s design can be seen in 
Figure 8.  
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Figure 6. Glitch Circuit Introduced by Anilao [ 9] implementing the equation F = A’C + AB. 
 
 
Figure 7. Karnaugh Map of Anilao's Design from [9] 
The TGP measures the delay between two paths by using a one hot state shift register 
to count glitches which occur at its output when its input is pulsed. Figure 9 shows an 
example of outputs that the shift register may receive. The red and blue lines are 
representative of the paths in the TGP in Figure 8. Adding or removing delay in the 
tunable delay element will cause the colored lines in Figure 9 to shift to the right and left 
respectively. When the delay has been equalized, the output of the TGP will be a constant 
signal as in Figure 9 (c), this is because the path controlling the falling edge of the glitch 
has more delay than the path controlling the rising edge. 
 
Figure 9. Glitch Probe outputs. (
Stanton used the TGP as a foundation for the concept of Circuit DNA and a 
fingerprinting unit. Using an array of TGPs, he used a characterized an FPGA by 
sweeping the tunable delay elements across a range of 0
table format, which he referred to as Circuit DNA. 
seen in Figure 10. Circuit DNA was a byproduct of Stanton’s research, generated in 
early stages of his research.
repeatable fingerprint. By using a cascading array of TGPs, with buffer select lines 
connected together, he sought to generate unique fingerprint strings to describe in
FPGAs. His digital fingerprint was more than 90% stable, and among the FPGAs he 
tested had a distinguishability of about 4.5%.
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While Circuit DNA seemed to be a side effect of Stanton’s research, it provides 
an important basis for new research. By sweeping through all 256 possible input buffer 
values between zero and fifteen on both upper and lower paths, Stanton was able to 
determine at which buffer combinations the TGP produced a balanced delay. As can be 
seen in Figure 10, blocks in the table colored green represent buffer combinations which 
result in more delay in the bottom path of the TGP, while yellow blocks represent 
combinations where the top path contains more delay.    
 
Figure 10. Circuit DNA for one TGP[8] 
 The locations where green and yellow blocks meet in the table represent buffer 
combinations where instability could occur when compared across several FPGAs. 
Stanton’s design for a system to generate a digital fingerprint based on the TGP involved 
cascading groups of TGPs in order to accumulate their delay to measurable levels. 
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Cascading the TGPs resulted in Circuit DNA being able to be generated for all TGPs in 
the system which would produce different results due to the accumulation of the delay.  
2.4 Literature Review Summary 
PUF designs and AFIT’s Digital Fingerprint depend on physical random variations 
due to the integrated circuit manufacturing process. Several promising designs have 
already been proposed, but show that a trade off exists between stability on a single 
device, and distinguishability across multiple devices. Research already performed in the 
area of Digital Fingerprints provides a starting point for further research, providing a 
tunable probe for delay measurement.   
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III.  Methodology 
The following chapter explores the methodology behind three major elements of 
this research.  These elements include the generation of Circuit DNA, Digital 
Fingerprints, and Digital Keys (DK). Circuit DNA as described in Section 2.3, is a 
method used to characterize the delay between paths on the FPGA which can be used as 
unique identifiers for the device. Digital Fingerprinting involves using the information 
obtained through Circuit DNA to create unique identifiers that rely on a specific input 
combination to the digital glitch probe as discussed in Section 2.3. Digital Key generation 
is a method which relies on the uniqueness of Circuit DNA to generate unique bit strings 
based on input values to the digital glitch probe which have been chosen in a specific 
manner, which can then be used as keys for polymorphic circuits, software, or 
encryption.    
This chapter also introduces two performance metrics and explains their 
importance to this research. The first measure describes the repeatability on a specific 
FPGA of Circuit DNA or a digital key. This measure is known as stability, and is 
important to ensure that the same result can be achieved consistently. The other metric is 
called distinguishability; this measure ensures that a digital key is unique to a specific 
FPGA. Distinguishability is an important measure because it demonstrates a key’s ability 
to uniquely identify a device, allowing for the possibility of unclonable software.      
Chapter 3 also covers the experimental process used in this research and concludes 
with a summary of the methodology. 
18 
 
3.1 Problem Definition 
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis 
The goal of this research is to employ Circuit DNA extraction and Digital 
Fingerprint generation to produce distinguishable and repeatable digital keys. This goal is 
accomplished through the use of a Tunable Glitch Probe similar to design set forth by 
Stanton[8], to increase stability and allow for more user control. The hypothesis behind 
this work is that by measuring the delays between paths on an FPGA, the device can be 
characterized. This characterization can be utilized for both device identification, and for 
creation of unique device identifiers for use as encryption keys.  
3.1.2 Research Approach 
The desired outcome of this research is the creation and implementation of digital 
keys based on the physical random variations in the structure of an FPGA. This research 
uses these variations for the characterization of an FPGA’s path delay which is used to 
generate unique device specific identifiers that can be used as encryption keys. Variation 
in path delay is demonstrated in Figure 11, where the arrows point at the locations where 
the signal at two paths is being measured, both of which have been provided with the 
same input. Both signals arriving at the two points simultaneously will result in no path 
delay being measured, but if the signal is measured on one path before the other, a delay 
is observed which can be used as an identifying feature.  This approach of using path 
delay to characterize an FPGA is accomplished through three main phases; Circuit 
DNA/Key Generation, Comparison and Analysis, and Implementation. 
 
3.1.2.1 Circuit DNA/Key Generation
Leveraging the hardware design created by Stanton in 
new software using the response from the TGPs to generate Circuit DNA and digital 
keys. The software provides a method for individual buffer value selection on hardware 
system containing 128 TGP, something which was not available in past research efforts.
Using improved software and 
and analyzed. Digital keys 
analysis. 
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Figure 11. Measurement of Path Delay 
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3.1.2.2 Key Comparison and Analysis 
Comparison of the digital keys is very important in order to determine stability 
and uniqueness of the keys. The purpose of this comparison is to ensure that the keys 
generated are suitable for encryption. For a key to be suitable for encryption it must have 
a high rate of repeatability on a single FPGA while also remaining unique to that device.    
A bit-wise comparison of each key generated against other keys generated both on the 
same and on different FPGAs will be made to ensure keys are acceptable. Using the 
metrics described in Section 3.5, each key will be checked for suitability.    
3.1.2.3 Key Implementation 
Keys deemed appropriate for encryption use are used in conjunction with an FPGA 
AES implementation [29][30] made available by the AFIT VLSI group. The purpose of 
this exercise is for a practical implementation of this research, and for verification of the 
digital key concept.      
3.2 System Boundaries 
The System Under Test (SUT) is the Circuit Identification system (CiDs), as shown 
in Figure 12. CiDs consists of three primary components: the tunable glitch probe, an 
FPGA, and the on-board PowerPC processor. 
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Figure 12. Circuit Identification System 
 
3.2.1 Tunable Glitch Probe 
The tunable glitch probes are the heart of the CiDs design. The probe is designed to 
take two user defined buffer values, which are then applied to two signals within the 
probe. When the delay on these signals is equalized at a comparator, the system reports a 
value of 1. When the signals arrive at separate times, a value of 0 is reported. The tunable 
glitch probe used in this research is a two level design similar to that used by Stanton[8]. 
The design implements an AND-OR architecture and a redesigned buffer component, 
which now uses registers to store the value rather than two inverters which result in two 
gate delays per inverter. 
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3.2.2 Xilinx Virtex-5 FX FPGA 
The Xilinx Virtex-5 FX FPGA consists of an array of reprogrammable gates whose 
function is designated by the user. The FX series of the board also contains the PowerPC 
440 processor which is also used by the CiDs. 
3.2.3 Processor Core 
The Virtex-5 FX FPGA [31] contains an on-chip PowerPC 440 microprocessor 
which is utilized for CiDs. The PowerPC, acts as an interface between the user and the 
array of tunable glitch probes, handling user input and sending control signals to the 
probes. The PowerPC is responsible for communicating with the peripherals in the 
system including the TGPs and the UART which facilities the user interface through the 
RS232 port.  
3.3 System Services 
 The system used in this research provides the following three services. 
3.3.1 Circuit DNA 
 Circuit DNA returns 128 16x16 tables which describe the delay characteristics of 
the tunable glitch probes on the FPGA under test, one 16x16 table for each probe used in 
the system.   
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3.3.2 Digital Fingerprint Generation 
 Digital fingerprint generation uses one specific user chosen buffer combination 
for delay on the upper and low paths for every probe in the system, and returns a 128-bit 
string representing the digital fingerprint. 
3.3.3 Digital Key Generation 
Digital key generation is similar to digital fingerprint generation, the only difference 
being that 128 buffer combinations are specified by the user, an upper and lower buffer 
value for each tunable glitch probe in the system.   
3.4 Workload parameters 
 Workload parameters describe the requests for service within the system. These 
parameters describe the quantity and type of information that the system processes. 
3.4.1 Number of Tunable Probes in System 
 The number of tunable probes used within the system directly affects the ability 
of the system to produce usable device specific keys. The number of probes used within 
the system is equal to the number of unique bits that can be used as a DF or DK. The 
number of probes used, also determines how much area of the FPGA that the system is 
using. Ideally, an implementation with the minimum space is desirable since it allowsfor 
more space to be used by other systems on the FPGA. A trade-off exists between the 
system footprint and the number of unique bits generated by the system. Using too few 
probes can result in a DF or DK which contains too few bits, increasing the possibility 
that another FPGA will generate the same DF or DK. For example if only ten probes are 
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used, there are 1,024 possible DF or DKs that can be generated, if a population contains 
1,025 boards, we know by the pigeon hole principle, that two of the boards must generate 
the same DF/DK. For this research, 128 probes are used in the system, producing the 
possibility of 2
 possible combinations for DFs/DKs, far more possibilities than 
FPGA’s in existence.  
3.4.2 Number of Tunable Probes in Series 
 The number of tunable probes in series affects the delay in the signal entering 
each probe. If too much delay exists between two signals before they reach a probe, the 
ability to equalize the delay is diminished. When too many probes are placed in series, 
the accumulation of delay within the system becomes too great for an individual probe to 
overcome, resulting in a probe that produces a constant value for all buffer input 
combinations. Stacking too many probes in series can cause enough skew between a pair 
of paths which cannot be balanced with only fifteen probes in each path. Limiting the 
number of probes being used in series allows for uniqueness in keys as described in 
Section 3.4.2. For this research, the 128 probes being used are divided into partitions of 
32 probes in series, resulting in four groupings of 32 probes. This grouping was based off 
of observations made on research by Stanton [8], resulting in a design which for most 
circuits placements (discussed in Section 3.7), results in probes which produce non-
constant results. Using 32 probes in series ensures enough cumulative delay has built up 
on paths being measured in probes on individual chain to allow for unique delay 
characteristics to be observed, but not so much cumulative delay that the fifteen possible 
buffers on the paths in each probe are unable to equalize path delay. Adding more probes 
in series in the system has shown to result in path delays which cannot be equalized, 
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while using too few probes in series results in lack of distinguishable characteristics in 
Circuit DNA.      
3.5 Performance Metrics 
Two metrics are being used to characterize the acceptability of a both DFs and 
DKs, these metrics are used to compare multiple DFs and DKs to one another. The two 
metrics being used are a test for stability to ensure that a DF or DK on a given device is 
consistent, and a test for distinguishability to determine if DFs and DKs on multiple 
boards vary sufficiently enough to fall within defined bounds of acceptability.  
3.5.1 Stability 
A measurement of stability is a reference to how consistent a DF or DK is when 
generated multiple times on the same FPGA. Ideally, an FPGA will always produce the 
same DF and DK if given the same buffer input values. A stability measurement is 
presented as a percentage of bits which are similar in two given DF or DK values. DF and 
DK values generated on the same board may not always be exactly the same due to 
environmental conditions such as temperature and radiation. Stability across a 
temperature range is tested through the use of the ESPEC BTZ-133 Temperature 
Chamber. This piece of equipment, shown in Figure 13, allows for data to be collected 
over a temperate range for stability comparison. Temperature variation is collected for an 
ambient temperature range of 0–85 degrees Celsius. For a DF to be considered stable, it 
must have a stability measurement of 90% or greater when multiple readings are 
compared.     
26 
 
Two types of temperature stability will be tested. Limited Temperature Range 
Stability (LTRS), tests for stability over normal operating conditions at room temperature 
(20 degrees Celsius) plus or minus 10 degrees. Full Temperature Range Stability (FTRS), 
tests for stability of a DF or DK over a temperature range of 0-80 degrees Celsius, 
simulating extreme environmental variance. Ideally a DF and DK should have FTRS, but 
due to changes in transistor response based on operating temperature this is not always 
the case. At the bare minimum, a DF or DK must be LTRS in order to be usable.   
 
Figure 13 ESPEC BTZ-133 Temperature Chamber 
3.5.2 Distinguishability 
 Distinguishability is measurement of how different one DF or DK is from 
another. DFs and DKs generated on different boards should be sufficiently different from 
one another in order to avoid the possibility of another board generating the same DF or 
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DK.  A distinguishability measurement consists of a bit-wise comparison of two 
measurements, reporting the percentage of bits which are dissimilar, essentially a 
Hamming distance expressed as a percentage. The distinguishability measurement can be 
found in equations (3.1) and (3.2).  
% ℎ =  !"#$# % ∗ 100   (3.1) 
%ℎ = 1 − )"#$# % * ∗ 100   (3.2) 
For example, if two DKs consisting of 128-bits have 42 bits in common, they would have 
a distinguishability of ( 

!+

 ∗  100) = 67.2%. For the purposes of this research, in 
order for a DF or DK to be considered distinguishable, it must present a distinguishability 
of at least 10%, real world implementation would preferably be much greater. 
3.5.3 Stability versus Distinguishability 
 Stability and distinguishability are both important measurements which affect the 
ability to use a generated DF or DK, but there is a relationship between the two which 
must be kept in balance. While it is very easy to pick buffer values which result in a very 
stable DF or DK, it most likely won’t result in a key which is distinguishable. For 
example, using the Circuit DNA from a single probe shown in Figure 14, a choice of 
seven buffers on the top path and thirteen buffers on the bottom path (marked in red), will 
most likely be a very stable choice, in that no matter how many times a DF or DK is 
generated on this FPGA, the result will be a 0 for this probe.  This effect is due to the 
buffer location not being near the transition line for this probe; this buffer choice will 
most likely always result in a 0 on any FPGA because the transition area on Circuit DNA 
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tends to be in the same general area on all FPGAs. This buffer selection results in a very 
stable choice, but also an indistinguishable bit.    
 The opposite situation is also true, a buffer combination choice my be very 
distinguishable, but results in poor stability. Figure 15 shows a buffer choice which is 
probably very distinguishable, but most likely is very unstable. A choice of three buffers 
on the bottom path, and six buffers on the top path results in an inconsistent reading from 
the probe, 60% of the time it reads a value of 1. This buffer location is likely to fluctuate 
over many runs, causing poor stability, but it is a distinguishing characteristic of the DNA 
for this probe, and is in a good location for DF and DK generation, on a transition point. 
  
 
Figure 14. Poor Distinguishability Choice 
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Figure 15. Poor Stability Choice 
3.6 System Parameters 
System parameters if varied have an effect on the metrics or response of a system; 
the parameters of CiDs are described below.   
3.6.1 Buffer Selection  
Buffer selection is the main input to the system from the user. The selection of buffers 
controls the delay introduced to each probe, which is applied to the signals within the 
probe, affecting the output of each individual probe. The legal range of buffer values for 
both the upper and lower paths is from zero to fifteen. This allows for a total of 256 
possible buffer combinations. 
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3.6.2 Temperature 
Core temperature of the SUT has an effect on the response of the transistors in the 
system. Core temperature is affected by the ambient temperature around the SUT, and by 
controlling the ambient temperature, measurements can be made at different core 
temperature values. 
3.7 Factors 
 The factors within the system that are varied for this research are detailed below. 
3.7.1 Design Placement 
 The location of the TGPs in the design directly influences the response of CiDs. 
The placement on the FPGA dictates which transistors are being used, and thus affect the 
delay in each individual probe response used to generate the Circuit DNA, DF or DK. 
The Xilinx PlanAhead tool was used to create several design placement options on the 
FPGA, these placement options were then compared to choose placements which didn’t 
result in probes which produced constant values. 
3.7.2 Temperature 
 The core temperature affects the response of the transistors on the FPGA resulting 
in varying transistor delay. Normally, higher core temperature results in slower response 
from the transistors. Core temperature is affected by the ambient temperature around the 
FPGA. For this research, data is collected across a temperature range of 0-80 degrees 
Celsius.  
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3.8 Evaluation Technique 
The evaluation technique used in this research is measurement on real hardware. 
The experiment set up consists of several (3-5) Virtex-5 FX ML507 FPGA Development 
Boards which are running CiDs, a notebook computer connected to the FPGA via an 
RS232 connection for communication with CiDs and connected to the JTAG interface on 
the ML507 board via a Xilinx Development Board Programmer over USB, used to 
program the FPGA. This system is then contained within the  ESPEC BTZ-133 
Temperature Chamber, in order to collect data over a temperature range as described in 
Section 3.7.2. Data collected is transmitted to the notebook via an RS232 connection over 
the Hyper Terminal. This data is stored on the notebook for comparison and analysis. 
3.9 Experimental Process Overview 
The process by which this research is carried out is detailed in the chart presented 
in Figure 16. The process begins with the design of the CiDs system, both hardware 
and software design. It continues with Circuit DNA generation and comparison to 
ensure proper design placement. Once an acceptable design placement has been 
achieved, Circuit DNA is generated for several FPGAS and used to create input 
buffer selections for the creation of digital keys. Finally digital keys are generated on 
several FPGAs at varying temperatures and compared in order to test stability and 
distinguishability of the keys. This process is described in more detail in the 
following sections.  
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Figure 16. Experimental Process 
Hardware Design 
Design Placemenl C Software Design 
Design 
Compilation 
Vary FPGA and Temperature 
Circuit DNA 
Generation 
Do Constant 
producing TGPs 
exist? 
No 
Input Buffer 
Generation 
Digital Key 
Generation 
Digital Key 
Comparison 
and Analysis 
Vary FPGAffemperature 
33 
 
3.9.1 Hardware Design 
The CiDs system was designed within the Xilinx EDK Platform Design Studio 
version 12.4. An overview of the Hardware design can be seen in Figure 17.  The 
hardware design utilizes the PowerPC 440 core on the FPGA, as opposed running a 
soft-core MicroBlaze processor available as a programmable design by Xilinx. The 
PowerPC processor is used as a communication interface between the other hardware 
elements used in the design and the software. The other hardware elements used in 
the design are contained in user defined pCores connected to the PowerPC via a 
Processor Local Bus (PLB). 
The main backbone of the CiDs system lies in the user created core containing 
TGPs previously discussed. This pCore contains the major hardware design required 
for this research. The design is created using VHDL with input and output ports 
connected to the PowerPC via the PLB. The design includes 128 TGPs in four 
groupings of 32 cascaded probes as shown in Figure 18. This design allows for the 
input signal to propagate through 32 probes while also providing output glitch 
readings at each probe. The cascading of the probes allows for the accumulation of 
delay in the input signal as it propagates through the probes resulting in different 
amounts of delay in the signal as it is accessed by each probe. 
The hardware design also includes two additional pCores. These pCores include a 
UART interface and a BRAM controller. The UART interface is used to facilitate 
user input between the hyper-terminal and the PowerPC core. The BRAM controller 
facilitates memory access to the Block RAM located on the Xilinx development 
board, used to store the device software and system variables.     
Figure 
 
Figure 
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17. Block diagram of the CiDs design  
18. Tunable Glitch Probe connection design 
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3.9.2 Software Design 
The software phase of the design facilitates interfacing with the registers of the 
chained_design_selectable pCore, and the generation of Circuit DNA and Digital Keys. 
The software is written in C and runs on the PowerPC. The main tasks initiated the 
software include; initiation and control of the input signal sent to the TGPs, data 
collection and user interface. The software instructs the PowerPC to place a signal on the 
PLB that strobes the input signal to the TGPs, and then handles the corresponding output 
from the TGPs. Once the data is collected, it is stored in a three-dimensional array and 
formatted into the Circuit DNA, or used to produce digital keys based off of additional 
user input for input buffer values.  
3.9.3 Design Placement    
The placement of the hardware design on the FPGA is crucial to the 
distinguishability of Circuit DNA and digital keys. Using the PlanAhead software 
included in the Xilinx ISE Design suite, the design was placed in several locations on the 
board with the effects on Circuit DNA being observed after compilation. The details of 
this step are discussed in Section 4.2.3.1. 
3.9.4 Design Compilation 
Compilation of a design created in Xilinx EDK is usually a straight forward 
process consisting of simply pressing a button which automatically generates a netlist of 
the design, then using that netlist to create a bitstream that programs the FPGA with the 
hardware design. The hardware bitstream is then merged with the software and can then 
be used to program the FPGA with both hardware and software. Since this research 
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involved manually placing the hardware design on the FPGA using the PlanAhead tool, 
compiling the hardware and software was not as straight forward. When using 
PlanAhead, a bitstream is generated containing only the hardware design that has been 
manually placed. This bitstream cannot be combined within EDK with the written C 
code; this requires the use of a command line tool called Data2MEM [32][33]. This tool 
takes both a hardware bitstream and the compiled software as inputs and creates a 
bitstream which can be used to program the FPGA. This bitstream must them be 
downloaded to the FPGA via the iMPACT tool included in the Xilinx ISE Design Suite. 
The bitstream generated via the Data2MEM command line tool, once programmed on the 
FPGA can be used for testing and data collection.      
3.9.5 Circuit DNA Generation, Comparison and Analysis 
Circuit DNA was generated not only for data collection and analysis purposes but 
also to determine if the hardware placement on the FPGA was a good choice. Several 
placements were tested, with Circuit DNA being generated for each layout. The Circuit 
DNA was checked for probes which produced constant values, due to routing delays. If 
constant producing probes were found the placement was adjusted and retested.  
 Once a placement was decided on which did not produce constant probe readings, 
Circuit DNA data was collected for stability and distinguishability comparison on several 
FPGAs at varying temperature settings. These data sets were then compared using a 
custom perl script which compared individual table entries within Circuit DNA to report 
statistics on the stability and distinguishability of the comparisons. The perl script used 
can be found in Appendix A.1. 
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3.9.6 Input Buffer Generation 
Input buffer generation for use as selection values for Digital Keys is accomplished 
through the use of another Perl script. This script takes in an input of a comparison report 
from the Perl script used for Circuit DNA comparison and then generates two 128 
character hex strings to be used as input buffer selections for the TGPs. This Perl script 
chooses a value which is not constant between multiple boards and assigns it as an input 
selection value, if there are no non-constant locations, it will randomly choose a buffer 
value between 0 and 15. This script can also be found in Appendix A.2.    
3.9.7 Digital Key Generation, Comparison and Analysis 
Using the generated input buffer selection, the user is able to manually input the value 
into the CiDs system via the hyper-terminal to produce digital keys. The input buffer 
strings are parsed and used as lookup variables in the Circuit DNA that has been 
generated for the particular FPGA under test. Digital keys are generated across a 
temperature range on several FPGAs and then compared for stability and 
distinguishability using a Perl script which performs a bitwise comparison on a list of 
keys reporting back the number of matching bits, along with a stability and 
distinguishability measurement. This script available for review in Appendix A.3.  
3.10 Acceptable Parameters and Expected Results 
In order for Circuit DNA and digital keys to be considered successful and usable they 
must meet certain stability and distinguishability requirements. In order for Circuit DNA 
to be considered acceptable for use for digital key generation it must be at least 90% 
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stable at a limited temperature range of 20°±1 °C. Digital Keys on the other hand must be 
nearly 100% stable and have a distinguishability of greater than 10%.  
The expected results of this research coincide with the acceptable parameters. 
Previous work with Circuit DNA by Stanton [8], has already shown that circuit DNA is 
already about 90% stable, and with modifications made to the TGP, improvement is 
expected of around 5%. Stability of digital keys is expected to be 99.5% and 99.9% to 
account for possible error. Distinguishability of digital keys is expected to vary widely 
between about 15% and 70% due to input buffer selection.  
3.11 Methodology Summary 
 This chapter defines the experimental methodology for the Circuit Identification 
System. This research focuses on improving the Circuit DNA and Digital Key extraction 
through modification and more in depth data analysis. The SUT is clearly bounded, along 
with the system parameters, and its factors. The performance metrics of DF and DKs are 
clearly defined with values required for acceptance. An evaluation technique and 
experimental design has been described involving the test of CiDs on multiple hardware 
devices. 
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IV.  Results 
This chapter discusses and analyzes the data collected from the experiment detailed in 
Chapter 3. The chapter begins with an explanation of the experimental set up and then 
describes the individual tests performed and the results obtained.  
4.1 Experimental Setup 
Figure 19 depicts the hardware setup used for this thesis. The Xilinx Virtex 5 ML-
507 Development board is placed within the ESPEC BTZ-133 Temperature Chamber, 
and connected via USB and RS-232 to a notebook computer used for programming 
the development board, and as a user interface to the system. A lab power supply was 
used to ensure that stable voltage was supplied to the board.  A digital multi-meter 
was also used in conjunction with a temperature probe to monitor ambient 
temperature within the ESPEC chamber. 
 
 
Figure 19. Test Setup 
 
Figure 20 shows the ML
ribbon cable connects the USB programmer to the 16
board used for programming the FPGA and for mon
232 connection is used to connect the board to a serial port on the not
enabling user input and data collection via the hyper terminal. 
Figure 
 
4.2 Circuit DNA  
Circuit DNA was used as a basis for all of the experimentation performed for this 
thesis. Circuit DNA was produced and then used as a tool for generating digital keys. To 
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ensure that Circuit DNA was suitable for key generation, it had to be tested for stability 
and distinguishability.  
4.2.1 Stability 
To determine the stability of Circuit DNA , it was generated on an FPGA across a 
large temperature range. Multiple sets of Circuit DNA were produced at each 
temperature, and these were compared with other readings at the same temperature to 
determine stability at individual core temperatures. Figure 21 shows results for this test 
for one board, the data points represents what percentage of the individual probe entries 
were different in the comparison. Since the CiDs system includes 128 TGPs, and there 
are 256 table entries for each of the TGPs, resulting in a total of 32,768 entries. With such 
a large number of possibilities, even a couple hundred entries being different still only 
translate to a fraction of a percent. The large number of entries being compared positively 
affects stability by allowing many entries to be different without having and adverse 
affect. 
The values from Figure 21 when compared to the total number of entries and 
averaged together result in a stability of 99.86%. This value is much higher than 
expected, yielding a positive result. Stability near 100% is ideal for Circuit DNA since it 
reflects very little variation at a stable temperature, resulting in very few unstable entries 
which could possibly be chosen for digital key generation. 
Figure 21. Graph representing 
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percentage of different Circuit DNA entries across a temperature 
range 
e Range Results 
4.2.1, comparisons can be made 
temperature values. Figure 22 details the change in one 
 (outlined in red).  
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Figure 22. Circuit DNA effect of temperature change, a red square denotes the changing value. 
 
A comparison of Circuit DNA produced at an ambient temperature of -20°C (core 
temperature of 2.0°C) and 70°C (core temperature of 108.5°C) resulted in 705 entries 
being different, which is still a stability of 97.9%. At a more limited range, the results are 
even better, at both an ambient temperature range of 10-30°C and 10-70°C average 
stability is 99.6%. These results are much better than expected and are much improved 
versus results of Stanton’s implementation in [8]. This high level of stability across a 
wide temperature range ensures the stability of digital keys across a wide temperature 
range assuming that ideal input buffer values are chosen.    
Figure 23 details the effect of temperature as it changes across a wide temperature 
range.  The points on the graph represent the number of Circuit DNA entries which have 
changed between two temperature readings. As you can see there seems to be no 
correlation between the number of entry changes and the temperature, each board reacts 
in a different way. This test also shows that across a temperature range the number of 
entry changes is very low, a couple hundred changes out of 32,768 total entries, resulting 
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in very high stability. Additional Circuit DNA temperature stability results can be found 
in Appendix B.  
 
Figure 23. Graph representing the number of changed DNA entries across a temperature range 
 
4.2.3 Distinguishability 
Circuit DNA had to be generated on several boards and compared to one another 
in order to ensure against possible collisions which could occur due to another board 
producing the same set of Circuit DNA. Theoretically, a collision is very unlikely to 
occur since each circuit DNA report consists of 128 tables containing 256 entries 
resulting in  256
 (1.79 ∗ 1012) possible combinations. The main challenge present to 
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ensure distinguishability is assuring that none of the probes in the system produce a 
constant value; this is achieved through design placement. 
4.2.3.1 Design Placement 
Location of the design on the FPGA proved to be very important to circuit DNA 
which was distinguishable across multiple boards. The Xilinx PlanAhead tool was used 
to create multiple design layouts for testing.  The layouts were individually tested before 
settling on a final test layout. For each of the designs, the 128 probes were divided into 
four 32 probe units, these units were then placed on the FGPA with the goal of measuring 
the path delay in several areas of the FPGA. Measuring the delay in several areas of the 
FPGA is important for future implementation to ensure against device tampering.  Many 
of the designs tested resulted in probes which produced all ‘0’ readings. These constant 
producing probes were caused by too much path delay between probes. This excessive 
path delay is due to the routing of the connections on the FPGA being too long. Probes 
measuring these delays are unable to balance the delay between the two lines, resulting in 
a ‘0’ reading for all locations. Figure 24 shows placement designs which were rejected 
due to excessive routing delay. The final design used for testing is shown in Figure 25. 
Notice how in these designs there are four distinct blocks, these each contain 32 chained 
TGPs. The design in Figure 25 reduces the distance between blocks of probes, resulting 
in less routing delay, while also spreading the probes across multiple areas of the FPGA.  
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Figure 24. Three rejected circuit placement options 
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Figure 25. Design placement used for testing 
 
4.3 Digital Key  
4.3.1 Choosing Buffer Selection Values 
As discussed in Chapter 3, each of the TGPs used in the system must be provided 
with two buffer selection values to set the delay on the upper and lower paths. The 
determination as to which buffers must be chosen has proven to be one of the most 
difficult challenges in this research. Buffer values must be chosen in such a way that they 
tend to fall on transition areas on the Circuit DNA tables. A transition area is the area on 
the Circuit DNA graph where readings change from displaying glitches to being stable 
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with no glitches.  These areas generally include the two points on the table on either side 
of the division line between green and yellow blocks. An example transition area can be 
seen in Figure 26 in red. 
 
Figure 26. Circuit DNA Table showing Transition Area 
 
A transition area is not necessarily the same on every FPGA since circuit DNA is 
different between boards. The problem in choosing buffer values is that we have no idea 
which point will provide the most distinguishable results on all boards. We can make an 
educated guess as to which points will provide good buffer values based on data collected 
on several boards. One such approach to making educated selections involved attempting 
to determine the slope of the diagonal line formed by the transition area and choosing 
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points along that line as selection values. This approach was abandoned early in the 
design process due to the irregularly of the shape of the transition area in many probes 
which resulted in selection values that weren’t in the selection area,   
Figure 27 shows the approach taken which makes an entry by entry comparison of 
multiple FPGAs. The figure shows the Circuit DNA tables for the same probe on three 
different FPGAs, a fourth table shows which values on these boards are different from 
the first. The values which are different fall in the transition area of one or all of the 
boards. We know that by choosing one of these locations as the buffer selection values 
for this probe, the bit represented by this probe will not be the same on all three of these 
FPGAs. This process is fairly simple for 2 or 3 boards, but in order to produce keys 
which are distinguishable across many boards, we must make educated guesses by 
making comparisons between several boards and choosing the values which are different 
most often. For this research, digital keys were produced on four different FPGA’s using 
buffer selection values produced through such a comparison. 
 
Figure 27. Comparison of multiple Circuit DNA tables for choosing input buffer values 
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4.3.2 Digital Key Stability 
 The most important test performed for this research had the purpose of 
determining the stability of digital keys generated. This test was performed by generating 
and comparing multiple keys generated using the same input buffer selection values on 
the same FPGA. The initial tests performed indicated that the keys being generated were 
not as stable as would be needed for use as a digital key.  These initial tests showed that 
multiple keys generated on an individual board using the same input buffer values were 
between 98-99% stable, this translates to the possibility of one to two bit difference for a 
128-bit key. While many of the keys generated were exactly the same, occasionally a 
generated key would contain one or two flipped bits.  
 Ideally in order for a key to be usable it needs to be repeatable 100% of the time. 
In order to combat this issue of stability, a polling scheme was implemented in the 
software with the goal of eliminating the occasional flipped bits. The implementation of 
this polling scheme involved generating several keys and then performing a bit-wise 
comparison of the keys using the bit value which occurred more than half the time. The 
Law of Large Numbers [34](sometimes referred to as the “Law of Averages”), would 
suggest that if enough keys are sampled and compared, a usable key could be generated 
that is always the same. As this is not an ideal world, the possibility for error always 
exists, therefore their always exists the possibility that a bit-flip may occur. For testing 
purposes seven samples were taken and compared for each key generated. This number 
was chosen due to the amount of time required to generate the samples. A tradeoff 
needed to be made between stability and runtime, collecting more samples would 
theoretically result in keys which are more stable, but at the cost of increased runtime.   
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4.3.2.1 Constant Temperature Testing 
The first test performed on keys generated using the majority polling scheme 
described above was to measure stability at a constant temperature.  A total of seven keys 
were generated and polled to create a single digital key, this was performed ten times for 
each key and then a bit-wise comparison was made between each key. This comparison 
generated a percentage of bits which were the same. These percentages were then 
averaged together to produce a final stability rating expressed as a percentage.  A sample 
report generated is shown in Table 1. As can be seen from the data, the average stability 
of the FPGA with serial number ending in 0661 is 99.6%. This process was repeated at 
several different ambient temperature settings on the ESPEC Temperature Chamber, with 
the FPGA core temperature being closely monitored.  
 Figure 28 is representative of most of the boards tested. In most cases the keys 
generated were between 99% and 100% stable, with an instability occurring at a core 
temperature of about 45°C. Be aware that these results reflect only stability in a bit-wise 
comparison between keys generated at a constant temperature, and are not a reflection of 
comparison with keys generated at other core temperature values. 
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Table 1. Stability Report for FPGA 0661 at 31°C 
Keys being Compared Percentage of Matching Bits Number of Matching Bits 
0|0 100.0% 128 
0|1 100.0% 128 
0|2 99.2% 127 
0|3 99.2% 127 
0|4 99.2% 127 
0|5 100.0% 128 
0|6 100.0% 128 
0|7 99.2% 127 
0|8 99.2% 127 
0|9 100.0% 128 
1|0 100.0% 128 
1|1 100.0% 128 
1|2 99.2% 127 
1|3 99.2% 127 
1|4 99.2% 127 
1|5 100.0% 128 
1|6 100.0% 128 
1|7 99.2% 127 
1|8 99.2% 127 
1|9 100.0% 128 
2|0 99.2% 127 
2|1 99.2% 127 
 
. 
 
 
. 
 
 
. 
 6|9 100.0% 128 
7|0 99.2% 127 
7|1 99.2% 127 
7|2 100.0% 128 
7|3 100.0% 128 
7|4 100.0% 128 
7|5 99.2% 127 
7|6 99.2% 127 
7|7 100.0% 128 
7|8 100.0% 128 
7|9 99.2% 127 
8|0 99.2% 127 
8|1 99.2% 127 
8|2 100.0% 128 
8|3 100.0% 128 
8|4 100.0% 128 
8|5 99.2% 127 
8|6 99.2% 127 
8|7 100.0% 128 
8|8 100.0% 128 
8|9 99.2% 127 
9|0 100.0% 128 
9|1 100.0% 128 
9|2 99.2% 127 
9|3 99.2% 127 
9|4 99.2% 127 
9|5 100.0% 128 
9|6 100.0% 128 
9|7 99.2% 127 
9|8 99.2% 127 
9|9 100.0% 128 
   Average Stability: 99.60% 
     
 
4.3.2.2 Temperature Effects
Comparing the results gained in Section 
stability across a temperature range.  Performing a bitwise comparison of the ten keys 
generated at each temperature demonstrates the practically of key generati
limited and large temperature range. Unfortunately the results of the testing for this 
research did not show promise outside of a very limited operating window. On average 
the stability of the digital key was in the low 90’s for an ambient tem
20°C ±10°C, with measurements taken in 5
tested can be seen in Figure 
actually had an average stability o
 
Figure 28. Graph detailing stability readings across a temperature range
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4.3.2.1 with one another paints a picture of 
perature range of 
° intervals. The results from four of the boards 
29. As you can see in the figure, one of the boards tested 
f 89.7%, much lower than the others. 
30 35 40 45 50 55
Core Temperature (°C)
on in both a 
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Figure 29
4.3.3 Digital Key Distinguishabilit
As stated in Section 3.5
keys are. Using Equation 3.2, with a bitwise comparison of all of the keys generated at a 
particular temperature setting, we can obtain 
keys are from one another. Sample results from this
results shown in Figure A are representative of each of the readings taken at a limited 
temperature range. Keys generated on the
greater than 15% distinguishable, with an average distinguishability of 65%.
reflect those that were expected. While only a small amount of distinguishability is 
required for use in encryption a
allows for digital keys to be used as identifiers for an FPGA since the likely hood of a 
collision is unlikely due to a large number of bits being different.
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.  Average stability at room temperature,  20 ±10°C
y 
, distinguishability is a measure of how different two digital 
a measurement of how distinguishable the 
 test can be found in Appendix C
 boards used for this research were consistently 
 high level of distinguishability as shown in the results 
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4.4 Summary of Results 
The results in this section were divided between Circuit DNA and digital keys, 
describing both their stability on a single FPGA and their ability to be distinguished from 
one another when produced on separate devices. 
Tests performed on several boards producing Circuit DNA showed that not only is 
Circuit DNA repeatable at a given temperature, it is also greater than 99% stable across a 
limited temperature range. Circuit DNA proves to very reliable over a large temperature 
range with an average stability of 97%. While being very stable, Circuit DNA also proves 
to have enough distinguishability to allow for the creation of unique digital keys. 
Digital key generation results show a stability of greater than 99% at constant core 
temperature. Results across a limited temperature range of 20°±10°C, resulted in an 
average stability of about 92%, less than optimal for digital key generation. Digital key 
distinguishability proved to be very good at both constant and varying temperatures 
ranging anywhere from 15-60% distinguishable, results which are favorable for device 
identification.      
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V. Conclusions 
This chapter provides some conclusions drawn from this research effort and their 
significance.  These conclusions include those drawn pertaining to digital key stability 
and input buffer selection. This chapter also provides recommendations for future work 
which could improve the results gained through this research. 
5.1 Conclusions about Digital Key stability 
The main issue unearthed in this research is that without perfect stability, we cannot 
ensure that information encrypted using device specific generated keys will have the 
same results each and every time. While distinguishability is important to ensure against 
possible key collisions, all that is needed for a digital key to be unusable for encryption is 
a difference of a few bits. This is due to the avalanche effect present in cryptographic 
algorithms[35]; a difference of one bit in a large key will yield drastically different 
results.  A difference of one bit in 128-bit digital key results in a very high stability, but 
since the key is not a 100% match, the avalanche effect would cause a cryptographic 
algorithm to yield a completely different result. I believe that the key to this problem lies 
in input buffer selection. 
5.1.1 Input Buffer Selection  
As previously discussed in Section 4.3.1, input buffer selection directly affects which 
values are used for the digital key based off Circuit DNA. Input buffer selection also 
indirectly controls stability, values chosen may not always reflect a ‘10’ or ‘0’ value 
within the Circuit DNA leading to a stability problem which can easily be fixed by 
selecting a different set of inputs. This research has shown that research effort needs to be 
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placed in the area of input buffer selection, to be able to produce a product that can 
operate realistically outside of a lab setting. 
5.2 Research Conclusions 
 The outlook of Circuit DNA being used for device specific digital keys looks 
promising. The improvements made to the TGP design have increased stability across a 
large temperature range allowing it to become more effective for field use. The 
connection between Circuit DNA and key generation needs to be improved in order to 
ensure stability for digital keys.   
While digital key stability is still an issue with this research, it does not overshadow it 
as to prevent it from yielding positive results. Since stability is very high in a limited 
room temperature setting, device specific keys generated on a board can be used with a 
high level of trust given that core temperature is monitored and maintained at a nearly 
constant value. While this is not ideal for field use, it can still be used in controlled 
environments. Due to the possibility of keys being less than 100% stable in an extended 
temperature range, a simple protocol change could more than account for the stability 
issue. Generating multiple keys and encrypting data multiple times can account for the 
possibility of slightly different keys, ensuring that at least one of the datasets can be 
decrypted later.  
5.3 Contributions 
The contributions of this research include:  
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 Implemented 128-bit digital fingerprint system with user controllable buffer 
selection for individual tunable probes. 
 Improved stability of Circuit DNA over a large temperature range to greater than 
95%. 
 Development of a simple buffer selection scheme using data gathered from 
multiple boards. 
 Improved stability of previous tunable glitch probe design from a reported 96% to 
nearly 100% in a limited temperature range. 
5.4 Future Work 
• Improved method of input buffer selection values for use in digital key generation 
through the comparison of Circuit DNA between many FPGAs over a large 
temperature range. 
• Implementation on Virtex 6, paired with 128-bit hardware AES. This would 
involve modifying existing software to operate with the Xilinx Micro-Blaze soft-
core processor. 
• Digital Key implementation as controlling values for polymorphic architecture. 
Using a circuit design which utilizes polymorphic gates, digital keys could be 
used to enable proper functionality.  
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Appendix A 
A.1 Circuit DNA Comparison Perl Script 
 This Perl script is used to generate a comparison of multiple Circuit DNA data 
sets to generate a comparison report as detailed in Section 4.3.1. 
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# do th1s for each lioe 
for (Slines • 0; ~lines < 16; ~ l ines++) { 
Sk ++; 
# convert line to OITO.Y f or companson 
print OUTPUT " \n" ; 
#print $CONAO[$k). 
@lineO • split ( ', ' , 
@line l • split ( ', ' , 
@linez • s plit ( 'It I 
@lin"3 • split ( ', ' , 
#pr int line number 
if (SlinQS < 10 ){ 
SCDNAO [Sk) ) ; 
$CDNA1 [$k)); 
SCDNA:: I Sk I ) ; 
$CDNA3 [Sl< )) ; 
print OUTPUT "$lines,• ; 
e 1s if ( $lines == 10)( 
print OUTPUT "A," ; 
elaif ( $linQS •• 11)( 
print OUTPUT "B,• ; 
e l s if ( $lines == 1 2)( 
print OUTPUT "C, " ; 
elaif ( $lin"s •• 13)( 
print OUTPUT •o,• ; 
e l s if ( $lines == 14)( 
print OUTPUT "£," ; 
elaif ( $lin"~ •• 15){ 
print OUTPUT •r,• ; 
# do this for each column (each item in each line) 
f o r ($column = 1 ; $column < 17; $column++ ) ( 
# compare each item from each of the three files 
if ($line0 [ $column) ! = $line1 [$column) && Sline0 [$column) ! = $line2 [ $column) ) ( ## 
this li e~~ can be modified to account for more input f iese 
##I I ($1ine0[$column] == $ 1inel[$column] && $ 1ine0[$oolumn] '= $1ine2[$column] ))(## && $1ine0[$column] '= $1ine3($cohonn])( 
# # they are not equal print an 'X' 
$item = $column- l ; #this fixesO!l indexing problem 
print OUTPtTT "X," ; 
$total++ ; 
print OUTPtTT2 "Slines,$item\n" 
9 l S9 ( 
print OUTPtTT " _ , " ; 
print OUTPUT2 "X" ; 
print OUTPUT "\n\n\n\n\n" ; 
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A.2 Input Buffer Selection Perl Script 
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print OUTPUT "Upper:\ t" ; 
for ( $ i = 0 ; $ i < 1 29; $ i ++) ( 
if ( $upper ( $ i ) == 1 0 ) ( 
print OUTPUT u au ; 
elsif ( $upper ( $ i ) == 11) { 
print OUTPUT "b" ; 
e lsif ( $upper ( $ i ) == 12 ) { 
print OUTPUT "c" ; 
elsif ( $upper [ $ i ] == 13 ) { 
print OUTPUT "d" ; 
elsif ( $upper ( $ i ) == 14 ) { 
print OUTPUT "e" ; 
elsif ( $upper [ $ i ] == 15 ) { 
print OUTPUT "f" ; 
else { 
print OUTPUT $ upper ( $i ); 
print OUTP UT "\nLower: \t" ; 
for ( $ i = 0 ; $ i < 1 2 9 ; $i ++) { 
if ( $ lower ( $ i ) == 1 0 ) { 
print OUTPUT n a II ; 
elsif ( $lower ( $ i ) == 11) { 
print OUTPUT "b" ; 
e lsif ( $lower ( $ i ) == 12 ) { 
print OUTPUT "c" ; 
elsif ( $lower ( $ i ) == 13 ) { 
print OUTPUT "d" ; 
e lsif ( $lower [ $ i l == 14 )1 
print OUTPUT "e" ; 
elsif ( $lower ( $ i ) == 15 ) { 
print OUTPUT "f" ; 
e lse { 
print OUTPUT $ lower ( $i ); 
close LIST; 
close OUTP UT; 
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A.3 Bitwise Digital Key Comparison Perl Script 
 
 
#t/usrllocallbin/per l 
# 
# 
Bitw ise Dtgi tal Key COmpar l son 
# Author: Mj les McGee 
# Dateo Aug 2011 
# Description: This Pe.r l SCript t a kes in a list of digital keys an repor ts back 
# stab iliTy and dist-inguishability statist-ics on them. 
##input forma.-t 
#pert bttwiseCompa:r e mputfile.txt outputfile.txt 
#toke in list of keys f or comparison 
opon ( KE YS, $ARGV [ 0 )) o r dio "Can't open '$ARGV[0)'\n" ; 
chomp ( $ARGV [ 1 I ) ; 
# create array that contains The. lines in The fi le 
@keys - < KEYS> ; 
~reaTe output f ile 
opon ( OUTPUT, ">$ARGV[1]" ); 
S nuwKeys - @keys ; 
print ·N~r of Keys: $numKeys,n• ; 
print OUTPUT •Number of Keys : $numKeys\n• ; 
for ($i - 0 ; $ i < $numKeys; $i++)( 
# stor e currenT line in array 
@current - spl.it ( ll , $keys [ $i)) ; 
##compar e e ach line. wrth every other line 
for ( $ j - 0 ; $j < $numKeys ; $j++) 
$sum • 0; 
##be aware t-OOT this appr oach compares the current line wit h iTself . so eoch line should have a comparison of 100"'-
@nextLine - .spl.it ( ll, $keys [ $j ) ); 
# che ck each bit 
$ sum - 0 ; 
f o r ( $ k - 0 ; $k < 1 28; $k++) ( 
if ($ current [ $ k ) -- $nextLine [ $k) ) 
$sum+ + ; 
$ parcentSame - ( $ sum I 1 2 8 ); 
$ parcentDist - 1 - ( $ sum I 1 28) ; 
push ( @average Axray 1 $percentSame); 
print ~$il$j\t$percentSame\t$sum\t\t $percentDist \nB ; 
print O UTPUT •$il$j\t$percentSame\t$sum\t\t $percentDist \n• ; 
for (Sm • 0 ; s~ < SnumKeys; Sw.++){ 
$sum • $sum + $averageArray [$m); 
$average • $sum I SnurnKeys; 
print " \ nAverage Stability: $average" ; 
print OUTPUT "\nAverage Stability: $average" ; 
eloso OUTPUT; 
eloso KEYS; 
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Appendix B 
B.1 Analysis of Circuit DNA Entry Changes Across a Large Temperature Range  
The following tables detail the change in location of the transition point across a 
temperature range. The entries in the table represent the average percentage of lines 
within a probe that have changed since the last temperature reading (Ambient 
temperature readings taken at 10°C were compared with readings taken at 0°C). Values 
close to zero provide the best stability at a given temperature. 
The readings have been split into four tables which represent the probe chains as 
shown in Figure 18. An average is shown at the bottom of the last tables which represents 
the average percentage of transition locations at that temperature. The purpose of this 
table is to aid in temperature range selection for best possible stability. This table could 
also be used to determine which probes provide the most stable transition points at a 
particular temperature, leading to the ability to choose specific probes for a digital key, 
requiring more probes in the system to retain a key size of 128-bits. 
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Table 2. Analysis of Circuit DNA entry changes across a Large Temperature Range 
Approx Core Temp 20 30 40 50 65 80 95 110 
Ambient Temp 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
Probe 127 3.1% 4.7% 4.7% 9.4% 4.7% 7.8% 7.8% 4.7% 
 
126 1.6% 0.0% 9.4% 4.7% 9.4% 7.8% 4.7% 12.5% 
 
125 4.7% 1.6% 12.5% 4.7% 10.9% 7.8% 1.6% 9.4% 
 
124 7.8% 6.3% 10.9% 7.8% 4.7% 1.6% 4.7% 6.3% 
 
123 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 6.3% 7.8% 7.8% 4.7% 6.3% 
 
122 3.1% 0.0% 3.1% 7.8% 9.4% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 
 
121 0.0% 1.6% 3.1% 3.1% 6.3% 6.3% 3.1% 6.3% 
 
120 0.0% 6.3% 4.7% 7.8% 1.6% 3.1% 7.8% 3.1% 
 
119 4.7% 1.6% 1.6% 3.1% 3.1% 4.7% 4.7% 6.3% 
 
118 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 3.1% 1.6% 3.1% 
 
117 0.0% 3.1% 6.3% 1.6% 0.0% 6.3% 6.3% 7.8% 
 
116 1.6% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 4.7% 6.3% 
 
115 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 4.7% 9.4% 
 
114 0.0% 4.7% 4.7% 1.6% 4.7% 0.0% 6.3% 7.8% 
 
113 1.6% 1.6% 3.1% 3.1% 9.4% 1.6% 9.4% 9.4% 
 
112 0.0% 4.7% 1.6% 1.6% 6.3% 4.7% 0.0% 7.8% 
 
111 3.1% 7.8% 0.0% 1.6% 3.1% 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 
 
110 1.6% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 6.3% 7.8% 1.6% 0.0% 
 
109 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 6.3% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 7.8% 
 
108 3.1% 3.1% 1.6% 3.1% 4.7% 1.6% 0.0% 6.3% 
 
107 3.1% 3.1% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.3% 7.8% 
 
106 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 6.3% 6.3% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 
 
105 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 
 
104 0.0% 3.1% 3.1% 0.0% 4.7% 1.6% 3.1% 7.8% 
 
103 1.6% 4.7% 6.3% 1.6% 4.7% 3.1% 6.3% 4.7% 
 
102 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.7% 1.6% 1.6% 6.3% 3.1% 
 
101 3.1% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 4.7% 0.0% 
 
100 1.6% 3.1% 4.7% 0.0% 1.6% 6.3% 1.6% 3.1% 
 
99 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 6.3% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 
 
98 1.6% 4.7% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 4.7% 1.6% 1.6% 
 
97 3.1% 1.6% 1.6% 3.1% 1.6% 0.0% 3.1% 1.6% 
 
96 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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Approx Core Temp 20 30 40 50 65 80 95 110 
Ambient Temp 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
 
95 1.6% 1.6% 6.3% 6.3% 6.3% 7.8% 3.1% 3.1% 
 
94 1.6% 4.7% 7.8% 4.7% 4.7% 3.1% 4.7% 12.5% 
 
93 3.1% 4.7% 6.3% 7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 6.3% 10.9% 
 
92 4.7% 4.7% 9.4% 9.4% 7.8% 6.3% 4.7% 9.4% 
 
91 4.7% 7.8% 3.1% 6.3% 10.9% 4.7% 3.1% 9.4% 
 
90 1.6% 9.4% 6.3% 4.7% 6.3% 3.1% 6.3% 7.8% 
 
89 4.7% 3.1% 7.8% 9.4% 4.7% 3.1% 7.8% 9.4% 
 
88 4.7% 3.1% 4.7% 6.3% 4.7% 4.7% 6.3% 4.7% 
 
87 6.3% 1.6% 6.3% 6.3% 9.4% 7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 
 
86 1.6% 9.4% 4.7% 7.8% 7.8% 4.7% 3.1% 10.9% 
 
85 3.1% 7.8% 10.9% 6.3% 7.8% 3.1% 6.3% 14.1% 
 
84 3.1% 6.3% 7.8% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 6.3% 4.7% 
 
83 0.0% 1.6% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7% 9.4% 4.7% 10.9% 
 
82 1.6% 1.6% 3.1% 1.6% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 10.9% 
 
81 3.1% 7.8% 4.7% 10.9% 4.7% 9.4% 3.1% 3.1% 
 
80 6.3% 3.1% 3.1% 6.3% 6.3% 4.7% 1.6% 7.8% 
 
79 6.3% 6.3% 3.1% 1.6% 3.1% 6.3% 1.6% 7.8% 
 
78 1.6% 4.7% 1.6% 9.4% 4.7% 6.3% 3.1% 3.1% 
 
77 0.0% 0.0% 6.3% 1.6% 0.0% 3.1% 4.7% 3.1% 
 
76 3.1% 3.1% 0.0% 6.3% 4.7% 0.0% 1.6% 3.1% 
 
75 0.0% 1.6% 3.1% 3.1% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 4.7% 
 
74 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 3.1% 3.1% 1.6% 0.0% 3.1% 
 
73 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 
 
72 3.1% 0.0% 3.1% 1.6% 0.0% 9.4% 3.1% 1.6% 
 
71 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 
 
70 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
69 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 
 
68 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
67 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 3.1% 3.1% 
 
66 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
65 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 4.7% 1.6% 3.1% 0.0% 1.6% 
  64 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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63 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 4.7% 3.1% 
 
62 0.0% 3.1% 3.1% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 3.1% 
 
61 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
60 0.0% 1.6% 3.1% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 4.7% 
 
59 0.0% 3.1% 1.6% 3.1% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 4.7% 
 
58 3.1% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 6.3% 
 
57 4.7% 0.0% 3.1% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
56 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 1.6% 4.7% 1.6% 0.0% 4.7% 
 
55 3.1% 0.0% 1.6% 4.7% 3.1% 3.1% 1.6% 6.3% 
 
54 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 6.3% 4.7% 1.6% 3.1% 
 
53 0.0% 1.6% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 7.8% 1.6% 6.3% 
 
52 0.0% 4.7% 6.3% 1.6% 6.3% 4.7% 1.6% 6.3% 
 
51 3.1% 3.1% 1.6% 6.3% 4.7% 1.6% 4.7% 7.8% 
 
50 1.6% 1.6% 4.7% 3.1% 6.3% 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 
 
49 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 3.1% 1.6% 3.1% 1.6% 
 
48 3.1% 6.3% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 3.1% 3.1% 0.0% 
 
47 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 3.1% 3.1% 4.7% 3.1% 4.7% 
 
46 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 7.8% 
 
45 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 6.3% 1.6% 4.7% 
 
44 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 7.8% 1.6% 4.7% 
 
43 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 4.7% 0.0% 9.4% 
 
42 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 3.1% 0.0% 4.7% 
 
41 0.0% 4.7% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 
 
40 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 1.6% 7.8% 
 
39 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 3.1% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 
 
38 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 
 
37 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 
 
36 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 3.1% 4.7% 
 
35 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.7% 3.1% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 
 
34 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 1.6% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
33 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.7% 
 
32 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 1.6% 3.1% 1.6% 1.6% 
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31 3.1% 7.8% 4.7% 7.8% 7.8% 10.9% 7.8% 14.1% 
 
30 3.1% 4.7% 9.4% 12.5% 6.3% 14.1% 9.4% 15.6% 
 
29 3.1% 10.9% 10.9% 12.5% 9.4% 14.1% 3.1% 14.1% 
 
28 3.1% 1.6% 9.4% 17.2% 12.5% 10.9% 3.1% 12.5% 
 
27 3.1% 9.4% 7.8% 7.8% 4.7% 7.8% 6.3% 14.1% 
 
26 0.0% 14.1% 12.5% 7.8% 4.7% 9.4% 15.6% 10.9% 
 
25 1.6% 7.8% 7.8% 7.8% 0.0% 6.3% 4.7% 4.7% 
 
24 1.6% 17.2% 3.1% 9.4% 6.3% 6.3% 12.5% 6.3% 
 
23 3.1% 3.1% 6.3% 7.8% 7.8% 9.4% 4.7% 10.9% 
 
22 3.1% 6.3% 3.1% 6.3% 10.9% 6.3% 6.3% 10.9% 
 
21 3.1% 4.7% 10.9% 12.5% 10.9% 10.9% 9.4% 9.4% 
 
20 3.1% 7.8% 6.3% 12.5% 3.1% 10.9% 4.7% 3.1% 
 
19 6.3% 6.3% 4.7% 10.9% 12.5% 7.8% 6.3% 9.4% 
 
18 6.3% 6.3% 4.7% 6.3% 6.3% 7.8% 6.3% 4.7% 
 
17 0.0% 3.1% 6.3% 6.3% 10.9% 7.8% 4.7% 10.9% 
 
16 0.0% 3.1% 9.4% 4.7% 12.5% 6.3% 3.1% 14.1% 
 
15 6.3% 1.6% 4.7% 7.8% 3.1% 4.7% 3.1% 7.8% 
 
14 0.0% 6.3% 7.8% 3.1% 12.5% 3.1% 3.1% 10.9% 
 
13 1.6% 6.3% 6.3% 4.7% 7.8% 4.7% 4.7% 3.1% 
 
12 1.6% 4.7% 9.4% 4.7% 6.3% 6.3% 6.3% 3.1% 
 
11 3.1% 1.6% 3.1% 6.3% 12.5% 6.3% 0.0% 4.7% 
 
10 1.6% 3.1% 7.8% 1.6% 6.3% 1.6% 0.0% 9.4% 
 
9 0.0% 4.7% 3.1% 6.3% 7.8% 1.6% 3.1% 3.1% 
 
8 4.7% 0.0% 7.8% 3.1% 6.3% 3.1% 3.1% 7.8% 
 
7 3.1% 1.6% 3.1% 4.7% 4.7% 3.1% 4.7% 0.0% 
 
6 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 3.1% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 
 
5 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 3.1% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 
 
4 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 4.7% 7.8% 1.6% 1.6% 6.3% 
 
3 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 3.1% 3.1% 4.7% 0.0% 6.3% 
 
2 3.1% 3.1% 1.6% 0.0% 6.3% 3.1% 6.3% 4.7% 
 
1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 0.0% 
 
0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Average 3.0% 4.4% 4.9% 5.2% 5.6% 5.4% 4.5% 6.8% 
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Appendix C 
C.1 Sample Digital Key Distinguishability Results 
This table details the results of a distinguishability test performed at an ambient 
temperature of 20°C on four FPGAs. Each FPGA is represented by two keys, the key 
groupings for the FPGA’s is 0-1, 2-3,4-5, and 6-7. Notice that keys from the same board 
have a very low distinguishability measurement, while keys from separate boards have 
much larger measurements. 
Table 3. Sample Digital Key distinguishability results 
Keys Being Compared Stability Measurement Number of Matching Bits 
Distinguishability 
Measurement 
0|0 100.00% 128 0.00% 
0|1 99.22% 127 0.78% 
0|2 4.69% 6 95.31% 
0|3 4.69% 6 95.31% 
0|4 85.16% 109 14.84% 
0|5 84.38% 108 15.63% 
0|6 71.09% 91 28.91% 
0|7 70.31% 90 29.69% 
1|0 99.22% 127 0.78% 
1|1 100.00% 128 0.00% 
1|2 5.47% 7 94.53% 
1|3 5.47% 7 94.53% 
1|4 84.38% 108 15.63% 
1|5 83.59% 107 16.41% 
1|6 71.88% 92 28.13% 
1|7 71.09% 91 28.91% 
2|0 4.69% 6 95.31% 
2|1 5.47% 7 94.53% 
2|2 100.00% 128 0.00% 
2|3 100.00% 128 0.00% 
2|4 19.53% 25 80.47% 
2|5 18.75% 24 81.25% 
2|6 33.59% 43 66.41% 
2|7 34.38% 44 65.63% 
3|0 4.69% 6 95.31% 
3|1 5.47% 7 94.53% 
3|2 100.00% 128 0.00% 
3|3 100.00% 128 0.00% 
3|4 19.53% 25 80.47% 
3|5 18.75% 24 81.25% 
3|6 33.59% 43 66.41% 
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3|7 34.38% 44 65.63% 
4|0 85.16% 109 14.84% 
4|1 84.38% 108 15.63% 
4|2 19.53% 25 80.47% 
4|3 19.53% 25 80.47% 
4|4 100.00% 128 0.00% 
4|5 99.22% 127 0.78% 
4|6 78.13% 100 21.88% 
4|7 77.34% 99 22.66% 
5|0 84.38% 108 15.63% 
5|1 83.59% 107 16.41% 
5|2 18.75% 24 81.25% 
5|3 18.75% 24 81.25% 
5|4 99.22% 127 0.78% 
5|5 100.00% 128 0.00% 
5|6 77.34% 99 22.66% 
5|7 76.56% 98 23.44% 
6|0 71.09% 91 28.91% 
6|1 71.88% 92 28.13% 
6|2 33.59% 43 66.41% 
6|3 33.59% 43 66.41% 
6|4 78.13% 100 21.88% 
6|5 77.34% 99 22.66% 
6|6 100.00% 128 0.00% 
6|7 97.66% 125 2.34% 
7|0 70.31% 90 29.69% 
7|1 71.09% 91 28.91% 
7|2 34.38% 44 65.63% 
7|3 34.38% 44 65.63% 
7|4 77.34% 99 22.66% 
7|5 76.56% 98 23.44% 
7|6 97.66% 125 2.34% 
7|7 100.00% 128 0.00% 
    Average Stability:  58.16% 
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